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Executive Summary 
This report summarizes key economic issues surrounding climate change legislation and 
regulation and considers potential implications for Nebraska, a state with a large agricultural 
sector and a focused manufacturing industry. The key findings are listed below. 
- While economic theory supports the imposition of taxes or other costs on polluters, 
effective policy requires the choice of an appropriate tax. Choice of an appropriate 
tax can be difficult in the case of greenhouse gas emissions because there is 
uncertainty about the economic costs of these emissions. There are two sources of 
uncertainty. First, there is uncertainty about the magnitude of the manmade 
contribution to global warming. Second, there is uncertainty about the extent to 
which global warming will harm the economy.  
- The public may still choose to regulate and reduce greenhouse gas emissions in 
order to reduce the risk of a severe economic outcome. However, when making such 
a decision, there is a need to understand the economic cost of climate change 
legislation or regulation.  
- For our analysis, we used the example of two recent climate change bills in the 
United States House of Representatives (Waxman-Markey) and in the United States 
Senate (Kerry-Lieberman). Our review of literature and analysis found that these 
examples of cap and trade legislation would be most likely to lead to an approximate 
2% reduction in U.S. GDP by the year 2030 relative to a reference scenario without 
climate change legislation. Losses in U.S. GDP may be less severe in the decades 
leading up to 2030, but would remain severe after 2030. The magnitude of the GDP 
loss could be less if there is a rapid adoption of new nuclear or renewable power 
capacity. 
- Retail electric prices also are expected to rise by 30% to 70% by 2030 under climate 
change legislation. The manufacturing sector will be especially hard-hit, with a 5% to 
7% decline in industrial output and manufacturing employment. 
- The economic consequences may be more muted in Nebraska given that the state is 
less dependent on the type of energy-intensive, internationally competitive 
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manufacturing sectors that are expected to be hardest hit by increases in energy 
prices. Nebraska also has a large agricultural sector that could be just lightly affected 
if it is exempted from regulation and would benefit from the opportunity to sell 
carbon offsets. However, it is uncertain as to whether these conditions would 
prevail. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
While the future of climate change policy in the United States is far from clear, it is fair 
to say that there has been a lively and active debate on the subject over the last decade, and 
even proposed legislative changes at the national and state level. For example, several versions 
of climate change legislation were introduced in either the U.S. Senate or U.S. House of 
Representatives during the 111th Congress. No version of climate change legislation became 
law, but the magnitude of the efforts during the last Congress suggest that our country will 
continue to debate potential approaches to limiting greenhouse gas emissions in the years to 
come. Future legislation is likely to be proposed, and, while political support for large-scale 
regulatory efforts may have waned in Washington, potential for regulatory action exists even in 
the near term. Specifically, the Environmental Protection Agency also has considered directly 
regulating carbon emissions. Enactment of such legislation or EPA action would have 
consequences for the national and Nebraska economies. Further, there are active efforts in 
many states to mandate renewable power use, a practice that would have many of the same 
economic features as the climate change legislation recently considered in Congress.   
This document is an effort to summarize key economic issues surrounding climate 
change and consider the potential implications of climate change legislation or regulation for 
Nebraska. We begin with a discussion of economic theory and principals that pertain to climate 
change regulation (or air pollution in general). Such a theoretical discussion by its nature would 
reveal criteria for identifying an economically efficient approach to addressing externalities (i.e., 
pollution) from greenhouse gas emissions. We also consider difficulties in measuring the 
magnitude and timing of any costs to the economy from greenhouse gas emissions. Measuring 
the characteristics of external costs is an obvious first step in designing an economically 
efficient policy response. 
We then consider the concrete proposals that have been developed to regulate 
greenhouse gas emissions. We consider the impact on the economy from legislation introduced 
in both the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate during the 111th Congress. This 
legislation did not become law, but it provides a useful framework in which to consider the 
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national economic consequences from a cap and trade system to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions. Specifically, we review analyses that have been conducted by the U.S. Department 
of Energy’s Energy Information Administration (EIA), as well as by private companies and 
business associations. We consider the consequences of regulation on a number of key 
economic variables such as energy prices, carbon prices, gross domestic product, and industrial 
production. In our analysis, we place an emphasis on the impacts of legislation or regulation on 
the electric power generation, agriculture, and manufacturing sectors. Following the planned 
scope of our study, we spend less time considering the specific impacts of climate change 
legislation and regulation on the transportation sector (although such impacts are included in 
some of the aggregated economic impacts we identified in the literature).  
Part of the reason for our interest in manufacturing and agriculture is that we also 
examine the potential economic consequences of climate change legislation or regulation on 
the Nebraska economy. Nebraska has a large and active agricultural sector that will face energy 
and input cost increases under climate change legislation, but will also have substantial 
potential to provide offsets for greenhouse gas emissions. Further, Nebraska’s mix of energy 
producing assets is different than the national average, so that the impact on utilities and 
energy prices may differ as well. Nebraska also has a lower concentration of the types of heavy 
industries that will be most disadvantaged competitively by climate change legislation.  
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Chapter 2: Economic Theory 
This chapter considers the consequences of climate change legislation and regulation 
from an economics perspective. We examine the basic economic issues related to pollution 
externalities, i.e., the types of pollution that sometimes accompany the production process and 
may impact other members of society. We then consider issues regarding the measurement of 
external costs for the case of greenhouse gas emissions, that is, the extent to which these costs 
can be defined and measured. We conclude by examining a variety of points of emphasis from 
the analysis. For example, the issue of discounting, or the process of putting the costs and 
benefits of future events back into current terms. This is an important issue in the case of a type 
of pollution that will have effects over the very long term. Another point of emphasis is the 
issue of policy coverage. In other words, what are the economic consequences when a 
regulatory policy is imposed on only a portion of the market? This is relevant in the case of U.S. 
climate change legislation and regulation to the extent that new regulation primarily will be 
imposed in the United States. 
 
A.  Basic Theory 
An externality is generated when a transaction that occurs between a buyer and seller 
also impacts a third party. In the case of a negative externality produced by the activity of a 
seller (we will use the term externality to imply negative externality in this report), the seller 
typically does not consider the costs being imposed on a third party. Therefore, the price at 
which the seller is willing to supply a good or service does not consider the full costs to society. 
The full social costs would include both the private production costs and these external costs. 
This situation is illustrated below in Figure 2.1, which shows both the private supply curve and 
the social supply curve for a seller who produces and sells a good that also generates a negative 
externality during the production process. Assume the example in Figure 2.1 represents U.S. 
electricity production. Electric power producers generate power using a variety of fuels and 
technologies, but many modes of generation also create pollution that impact households 
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located around the country. In this example, the electric power plant is the supplier, regional 
households, commercial businesses, and industrial firms are the customers, and the third party 
is households throughout the nation who face more pollution. The private supply curve for the 
electric power producer reflects the private costs for producing electric power, such as labor 
costs or the costs of purchasing fuel. The social supply curve reflects these private costs as well 
as the cost imposed on the third party: the households who face greater pollution. Note that in 
the example in Figure 2.1, these pollution costs rise faster than the cost of electricity 
generation, so the difference between the social supply curve and the private supply curve 
grows over time (Van den Berg, 2011(forthcoming)). This could occur if the externality costs of 
pollution grow rapidly as the pollution concentrates.  
Left on its own, the electric power generating industry would choose to produce at the 
point A. This is the price where the private supply curve meets the demand curve. However, if 
the private producers are required to consider the costs imposed on the third party (i.e., if  
these external costs are “internalized” through some mechanism, such as a tax on production), 
then the private producers will supply electric power according to the social supply curve and 
will choose point B where the social supply curve meets the demand curve. Note that the 
quantity of electricity produced is lower and the price is higher in the social equilibrium (point 
B) compared to the private equilibrium (point A). Internalizing externalities from production 
raises prices and also reduces the quantity produced, though both production and pollution 
continue at this lower, economically efficient level. 
Lower levels of electricity production also may imply changes in the output of the 
economy. Faced with higher prices, segments of the economy that utilize electricity, such as 
households, commercial businesses, and industrial businesses, may reduce the quantity of 
electricity they demand through adopting more energy efficient practices. For example, some 
households may switch to energy-efficient appliances, while some commercial businesses 
switch to energy-efficient lighting, and a manufacturing firm uses an energy audit to produce in 
a more energy-efficient manner. This switch may reduce electricity consumption, but also may 
raise costs and limit sales for these businesses. Business sales and activity also may decline to 
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the extent that businesses curtail energy use simply by producing less of their own goods and 
services. In other words, the output of the economy would decline along with inputs into 
production, including labor. This is the often-stated concern that efforts to reduce pollution in 
electric power generation will raise energy prices and lower the output of the economy.1  
Figure 2.1 
Equilibrium Production and Price With and Without Internalized Costs of Pollution 
 
 
The loss in economic activity, however, could be less if alternative technologies exist 
that can generate electric power without also generating pollution. In particular, electric power 
producers may find that it is less costly to adopt this non-polluting method of power 
generation. This alternative method would be more expensive (otherwise, it would have been 
chosen initially), but could be less expensive than the combined cost of generating electricity 
with the existing technology and paying a tax equal to the social cost of pollution.  
This situation is depicted in Figure 2.2. In Figure 2.2, as the zero pollution technology is 
adopted, the new private supply curve is the equivalent of the new social supply curve (since 
there is no pollution externality). This private supply curve using the alternative, non-polluting 
                                                             
1 Note that social welfare would still be higher at point B even if the measured output of the economy declines. 
This is because households would face fewer negative impacts from pollution (such as negative impacts on health), 
which would raise the quality of life. Further, there may be other, positive impacts on measured economic output; 
for example, a healthier population may miss fewer days of work due to illness. 
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technology is the curve SupplyALT.  SupplyALT intercepts the demand curve at point C. Point C 
represents a higher level of electricity generation and a lower price than point B. The more 
modest increase in energy prices and the more modest decline in electricity production would 
reflect a more modest decline in the output of the economy and related concepts, such as 
employment. The amount of pollution also would decline much more than at point B given that 
a large share of electric power would now be produced using the non-polluting technology. An 
outcome such as point C would therefore be preferable to point B. But, the key issue is whether 
a non-pollution technology exists that is sufficiently cost effective. If not, the SupplyALT curve 
would lie above the original social supply curve and firms would prefer to continue to use the 
polluting technology and pay the full social costs of pollution (i.e., point B), perhaps through a 
tax or some other method to internalize the pollution externality.  
  
Figure 2.2 
Equilibrium Production and Price Adopting Alternative Energy Technologies 
 
 
B. Another Example 
What other methods might exist to internalize a pollution externality besides levying a 
tax on electric power production or a cap and trade system (See Chapter 3)? One method that 
is championed by economists to internalize pollution externalities is to assign property rights 
7 
 
for the entity that is polluted. In the case of air pollution from electric power generation, it is 
impractical to assign property rights to the atmosphere; however, we consider another 
example below where assigning property rights for the polluted entity may be feasible. The 
advantage of assigning property rights for the polluted entity is that the owner of the polluted 
entity would have standing to demand payment for the damage done to their asset. Economists 
expect that this act would lead to an economically efficient outcome, assuming that transaction 
costs are modest.  
Consider the recreational lake that is being polluted by an adjacent factory. The 
pollution limits the value of the lake for recreational purposes. This is the negative externality 
resulting from the pollution.  
If someone is permitted to purchase the lake, then the owner of that lake would have 
standing to require a payment from the polluter for the ability to continue to pollute. That 
payment would compensate for the loss in revenue to the lake in the form of admissions fees 
by day visitors and the decline in the value of adjacent land for hotels and second homes 
bordering a polluted lake.  Such a payment would be subject to negotiation, but would need to 
at least equal the damage that is being done to the recreational value of the lake. This would 
lead to three possible outcomes:  
1) First, the polluter can make such a payment and continue to operate profitably. 
Continued pollution and factory production would be the socially optimal outcome. 
2) Second, the polluter may find that it is less expensive to install pollution abatement 
equipment than to pay for the damage done to the lake. Continued factory 
production without pollution would be the socially optimal outcome. 
3) Third, the polluter may not be able to pay the cost of their pollution in terms of 
damage to the lake and continue to operate profitably. In this case, the cessation of 
factory production (i.e., a reduction in economic activity) would be the socially 
optimal outcome. 
Note that in all three outcomes overall economic activity is maximized (depending on 
the relative costs of the pollution and the value factory output) due to the imposition of costs 
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on the polluter. If the factory output is valuable relative to the lost activity at the lake as in 
outcome 1), then overall economic activity is larger if factory production continues and lake 
activity is lower due to pollution. Or, the factory owner may find it cheaper to install pollution 
abatement equipment as in outcome 2). Finally, if factory output is not valuable relative to the 
lost economic activity at the lake as in outcome 3), then overall economic activity is larger if 
factory production ceases and lake activity increases to a higher level.  
On the other hand, if pollution costs are not imposed on the polluter, then overall 
economic activity will only be larger by coincidence, if it happens that outcome 1) is correct. 
This is why the assignment of property rights provides a way to internalize an externality that 
leads to an efficient outcome from an economics perspective.  
As was noted earlier, however, it is not always feasible to assign property rights. In such 
cases, the task of internalizing externalities may fall to regulators. In theory, the goal of the 
regulator would be the same as the owner of the property. The goal would be to require the 
polluter to make a payment equal to the costs imposed by their pollution as they continue to 
both produce an output and pollute.2  
In the case of greenhouse gas emissions, one would expect that all three types of 
outcomes could occur if the costs of pollution, once measured (see Section A.), are imposed on 
greenhouse gas emitters. Some emitters will continue to produce and pay for the right to 
continue to produce. Some emitters will change technology, adopting over time low- or no-
emissions technologies, and continue to produce but without emitting greenhouse gasses. 
Some emitters will cease production and the production of their product (usually energy, a 
factory output, or transportation services) will decline. All three of these occur in the example 
presented in Figure 2.2, at the equilibrium point C. 
Such an outcome might be beneficial to the economy. Nonetheless, it is important to 
note a key issue:  it is not clear how much cost to impose on electrical power generators or 
other emitters of greenhouse gases. This is because there is uncertainty about the cost of 
greenhouse gas emissions to society.  
                                                             
2 More precisely, the polluter should pay the marginal cost of pollution at their current level of production. 
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C. What is the Cost of Greenhouse Gas Emissions?   
From the preceding theory it is evident that it is critical to be able to measure the size of 
the external costs of pollution. This is never easy or precise, but methods do exist in many 
cases. For example, the more immediate health effects of smog can be measured in terms of 
health outcomes for older citizens, children, and asthmatics.  In other words, the size of the 
social costs of the externality can be measured with some accuracy (though there is certainly 
debate and disagreement on the magnitude of this externality). But, having some amount of 
clarity about the size of the external effect gives policy-makers the ability to choose the 
efficient level of tax per unit of pollution, that is, the level of the taxation that is estimated to 
lead to the economically-efficient level of economic activity. 
Precise measurement is substantially more difficult in the case of greenhouse gas 
emissions. The precise marginal influence of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere on climate 
change is not clearly understood and is a subject of considerable debate.  The timing of these 
impacts is also a point of substantial uncertainty. In other words, to what extent do additional 
greenhouse gas emissions at the current time relate to a change in climate now, in the decades 
to come, and in the more distant future?  
Even if these questions could be precisely answered, another uncertainty is the 
economic costs associated with climate change. The climate may change but how would this 
influence the economy? Some coastal cities may need to be moved or perhaps reinforced as 
global temperatures rise, and factors such as quality of life, agricultural productivity, and water 
supply may change in different regions of the globe. At the same time, costs may rise if weather 
becomes violent or extreme in certain regions. More generally, if humans have settled and 
concentrated in regions with a beneficial climate and environment, then factors that change 
climate and environment may create a mismatch that is expensive to remedy.   
The concern is that the marginal contribution of manmade factors to climate change 
could produce significant costs. Manmade contributions to climate change could impose future 
costs either directly by making our economy less productive or indirectly by curtailing future 
10 
 
economic growth as a substantial share of future investment must be devoted to mitigating the 
impacts of climate change.  
If the costs of the manmade contribution to climate change are substantial, there could 
be substantial future economic benefits from minimizing or reducing greenhouse emissions. 
Yet, as was noted earlier, there is uncertainty about the marginal contribution of greenhouse 
gases and other manmade activities to climate change. There is also uncertainty as to whether 
climate change resulting from manmade actions will lead to a modest future economic cost or 
to a very significant economic cost, or to a moderate economic cost somewhere in between. 
The implication is that efforts to regulate greenhouse gases and reduce the manmade 
contribution to climate change will lead to a broadly uncertain outcome. Such an investment 
could lead to relatively few benefits, or the investment could generate substantial future 
benefits. The situation is a bit like the purchase of automobile insurance. A driver who chooses 
not to purchase insurance may bear no cost or may bear a very substantial cost. Faced with this 
reality, many drivers choose to bear a significant cost for insurance to avoid the risk of a 
catastrophic outcome even though they may never need to file a claim. Drivers choose to do so 
because they believe it is a rational decision, or because they simply do not have the financial 
wherewithal to risk the catastrophic outcome.  
 Along the same lines, nations may choose to purchase “insurance” against the uncertain 
impact of greenhouse gas emissions on the climate and the economy by regulating and 
significantly reducing greenhouse gas emissions. However, any decision to purchase 
“insurance” also depends on the size of the premium. How costly will regulation of greenhouse 
gas emissions be to the economy? Societies may choose not to purchase this insurance if the 
premium is too costly.3 We consider these costs to the economy in Chapters 3 and 4 of this 
report.  
Finally, it is also true that the public may have a preference for avoiding climate change 
due to manmade sources on purely environmental grounds, even if there is no concrete cost to 
                                                             
3 Such a purchase of “insurance” by reducing greenhouse gas emissions would make little economic sense if one is 
certain that the marginal contribution of greenhouse gas emissions to climate change and economic losses is small.   
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the economy. Even in this case, the public still needs to understand the economic costs of 
pursuing such an environmental goal. Once again, it would be useful to measure the costs to 
the economy in terms of lower per capita income, gross domestic product, employment, and 
farm and manufacturing activity from actions to limit greenhouse gas emissions, and we will do 
so later in the report.  
 
D. Points of Emphasis 
 This section features several points of emphasis that were mentioned earlier in this 
Chapter, but require further discussion. We believe it would be useful for the reader to keep 
these points of emphasis in mind when reading the specific analysis in Chapters 3 and 4.  
 
 Discounting of Future Events 
 Policy analysis often must consider the time value of money. This is because public 
policies often impose costs and yield benefits that occur at different points in time. For 
example, the costs of regulations to reduce greenhouse gas emissions would begin in the 
present but might primarily influence climate change and economic consequences decades in 
the future. To consider the relevant trade-offs, policymakers and the public must have a way to 
compare future benefits with current costs.  In particular, benefits in the future must be 
discounted by the time value of money.4 The time value of money is often quite substantial. For 
example a 7% annual discount rate effectively “halves” the value of benefits every decade. One 
dollar of benefits occurring 10 years in the future would be worth $0.50 today, while $1 of 
benefits 20 years in the future would be worth $0.25 today. Looking further into the future, $1 
of benefits 50 years in the future would be worth $0.034 today, and benefits 100 years in the 
future would be worth $0.001 today. Such discounting implies that economic benefits from 
avoiding manmade contributions to climate change decades in the future will be heavily 
discounted relative to current costs. The costs of manmade contributions to climate change 
would have to be catastrophic to be comparable after discounting. However, some have argued 
                                                             
4 Costs over the next few decades also would need to be discounted but for fewer years. 
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that regulating greenhouse gas emissions would make economic sense even with such 
discounting. The argument centers around the uncertainty about the economic consequences 
of climate change (Weitzman, 2007). Distributions under uncertainty tend to have “fat tails,” 
meaning that the probability of an extreme outcome such as severe economic consequences 
(or of very minimal consequences) is larger than in a typical risk distribution. In such a situation, 
the present value of future economic consequences could be quite large even with heavy 
discounting over time (Weitzman, 2007). In other words, bearing significant costs to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions could pass a benefit cost analysis even under the types of heavy 
discounting described above.    
 
 Rearrangement of Global Industrial Production 
 Regulation of greenhouse gas emissions has substantial potential to lower the returns to 
private capital investment in industry, particularly in “heavy” industries that use energy 
intensely or that directly release greenhouse gases in their own production (Interagency 
Report, 2009). As noted earlier, production may decline in these industries with regulation of 
greenhouse gas emissions. This is especially true because many such heavy industries compete 
in an international market. Key competitors for these heavy industries may be located in 
developing countries that do not currently regulate greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. producers 
will face higher energy costs and perhaps their own pollution abatement costs after the 
introduction of regulations on greenhouse gas emissions. U.S. firms in heavy industries will 
operate at a competitive disadvantage as a result, and a larger share of heavy industrial activity 
may shift overseas to countries that do not directly regulate greenhouse gas emissions.5 To be 
more precise, production in these heavy industries, and the power plants that produce energy 
for these industries, may shift overseas to countries without greenhouse gas regulations. Heavy 
industries and associated power production may in this way avoid the greenhouse gas 
regulations. Similar phenomenon may also occur in other manufacturing or resources based 
                                                             
5 Some countries such as China that do not directly regulate greenhouse gas emissions do have programs to 
promote the use of more costly renewable energy resources. This raises energy prices and has many of the same 
impacts on the economy, and heavy industries within the economy, as direct greenhouse gas regulation.    
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industries.  The net result is that greenhouse gas emissions are not reduced as much as hoped 
and the negative impacts on the U.S. economy are larger than expected.  
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Chapter 3: National Economic Consequences 
This Chapter examines the potential consequences for the national economy from 
proposed climate change legislation. Specifically, in this Chapter we focus on the major climate 
change initiatives that were proposed in the 111th Congress, and note the potential for direct 
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency. 
 
A.  Legislative and Regulatory Proposals   
Climate and energy legislation similar to what was proposed in the 111th Congress could 
have a substantial impact on energy and greenhouse gas emission prices. An analysis of the 
proposed legislation from the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. Senate provides a 
baseline from which to consider the economic impact of climate and energy policies. 
The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454) was introduced by 
Representatives Henry Waxman of California and Edward Markey of Massachusetts and 
proposed a comprehensive set of provisions on clean energy, energy efficiency, and the 
transition to a clean energy economy. Specifically, the legislation proposed to set a combined 
energy efficiency and renewable electricity standard, to develop an energy productivity goal 
and strategic plan, and to establish a cap and trade system for greenhouse gas emissions with 
goals for reducing U.S. emissions from covered sources by 83% of 2005 levels by 2050. The 
legislation would have required emissions reductions or purchases of emissions offsets by all 
sources covered in the legislation. The Waxman-Markey bill passed the House on June 26, 2009 
by a 219-212 roll call vote. 
On the other side of Capitol Hill, Senator John Kerry of Massachusetts introduced S. 
1733, the Clean Energy Jobs and American Power Act on September 30, 2009 with co-sponsor 
Barbara Boxer of California. The bill, as reported from the Senate Committee on Environment 
and Public Works on February 2, 2010, included provisions to establish a system for greenhouse 
gas emissions with goals for reducing U.S. emissions by 83 of 2005 levels by 2050, to establish 
goals and standards for transportation-related emissions reductions including vehicle and 
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engine emissions, and to establish standards for new coal-fueled power plants. Similar to the 
House legislation, the Senate legislation would have required emissions reductions or 
purchases of emissions offsets by all sources covered in the legislation. The Senate legislation 
was not addressed on the floor and further efforts of Senator Kerry and Senator Joseph 
Lieberman of Connecticut to develop a comprehensive energy and climate proposal have died 
in this session of Congress. 
In the absence of Congressional action on energy and climate legislation, the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has indicated its plans to proceed with climate 
regulation. A 2007 Supreme Court ruling in Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) found 
that greenhouse gases are air pollutants covered by the Clean Air Act, providing EPA the 
mandate to address greenhouse gas emissions under its existing authority. In December 2007, 
the EPA Administrator published two findings regarding greenhouse gas emissions. 
· Endangerment Finding: The atmospheric concentrations of six specific greenhouse 
gases - carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons 
(HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF6) - endanger public health 
and welfare. 
· Cause and Contribute Finding: The emissions of these greenhouse gases from new 
motor vehicles and motor vehicle engines contribute to atmospheric concentrations and 
hence to the endangerment of public health and welfare.  
The endangerment finding provides EPA the rationale for greenhouse gas regulations and 
presents the pathway for a regulatory approach to greenhouse gas emissions in lieu of any new 
legislation. This approach could move forward in the coming months even as Congress tables 
comprehensive climate legislation. Potential EPA regulations could require targeted sectors 
(initially large industrial emitters such as power plants, etc.) to control emissions. There have 
been discussions of legislative proposals to prevent EPA from acting on the endangerment 
finding, but none of those proposals have moved forward through Congress thus far and don’t 
appear likely to in the remaining days of the current session. 
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B.  Structure of Recent Climate Change Legislation   
The major climate change legislation from the 111th Congress included the Waxman-
Markey legislation (H.B. 2454), which ultimately was passed by the U.S. House of 
Representatives, and the proposed Kerry-Lieberman legislation in the U.S. Senate. Both efforts 
were complex legislation with many specific requirements but the core of both bills was a “cap 
and trade” system for setting (and over time decreasing) the aggregate amount of greenhouse 
gas emissions from covered sources in the United States. In a cap and trade system, the primary 
approach of government regulators is not to cap the particular level of greenhouse emissions at 
a particular power plant, factory, or other covered emitter at a point in time. Rather, the 
approach of regulators is to distribute (either freely or through auctions) a specific number of 
emissions allowances at each point in time. The emissions allowances are set to meet 
regulatory goals for the total greenhouse gas emissions from covered sources in the United 
States in any given year. Once distributed, the emissions allowances can then be traded among 
parties. Further, these allowances are supplemented by offsets. Offsets can be purchased from 
non-covered emitters of greenhouse gases (who would agree to reduce their emissions), or 
from entities that sequester carbon. The end result is that covered emitters of greenhouse 
gasses such as utilities can continue to make their own decisions about their level of 
greenhouse gas emissions, but must submit allowances or offset credits equal to their amount 
of greenhouse gas emissions. 
Cap and trade legislation may provide flexibility to individual utilities, factories, or other 
covered emitters, but cap and trade legislation imposes significant costs on the economy. 
Essentially, over time utilities, factories, and other covered emitters must switch to alternative 
methods of production that emit little or no greenhouse gases but are more expensive. This 
substitution in the production process ultimately raises prices and reduces the size of the U.S. 
economy. For example, higher prices in the utility industry reduce the quantity of electricity 
demanded by households, commercial businesses, and industrial customers. This leads not just 
to less energy production but to a curtailment of economic activity throughout the economy. 
The reduction in economic activity is particularly large for manufacturers and others that are 
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intensive users of electricity. Manufacturers, of course, also may be covered emitters subject to 
cap and trade regulation and also may face by competition with manufacturers from countries 
who do not regulate greenhouse gas emissions.  
Both versions of cap and trade regulations propose to provide emissions allowances for 
free to impacted parties such as utility companies and manufacturers in the first two decades of 
the system before moving towards auctions to distribute the allowances. The distribution of 
free allowances to utility companies permits the companies to limit the energy price increases 
that curtail economic activity in these early decades. Similarly, free allowance distribution to 
the most energy-intensive manufacturing sectors limits losses in these sectors in the first 
decade of the program. The notion is that utilities and factories will have time to phase in low- 
or no-emission power plant capacity during the first two decades (EIA, 2009), and that new 
technologies will be developed during that period. The time also can be used for producers to 
identify and negotiate with potential providers of emissions offsets.    
The cap and trade system also attempts to mitigate its consequences for the economy 
by steadily reducing the number of emissions allowances over time, rather than immediately. 
The amount of potential offsets, however, is fixed over time so the net effect of declining 
allowances and fixed offsets is that the total amount of greenhouse gas emissions in the United 
States falls over time. Emissions-allowance caps limit total annual carbon emissions to a 
percentage of emissions in a previous year (typically 2005), and then incrementally reduce that 
percentage over time. For example, the Waxman-Markey legislation capped greenhouse gas 
emissions at 83% of 2005 emissions levels in the year 2020, to 58% of 2005 emissions levels in 
the year 2030, and to 17% of 2005 emissions levels in 2050. The Kerry-Lieberman legislation in 
the Senate follows a similar schedule. While there were differences, both pieces of legislation 
also followed a similar system for the free allocation of allowances in earlier decades and the 
use of offsets. These similarities mean that the economic consequences of the Waxman-Markey 
legislation and the Kerry-Lieberman legislation are broadly similar. In fact, the projected 
economic consequences of both pieces of legislation vary more based on the particular 
economic scenario (such as how cost-effectively low- or no-emissions technologies can be 
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implemented by utilities) than by the specifics of either the Waxman-Markey or Kerry-
Lieberman legislation.  Thus, in our analysis, we focus more on how the economic 
consequences of the two pieces of legislation will vary depending on key economic variables 
than on how economic consequences vary between Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman. 
This is particularly appropriate since it is highly unlikely that either piece of legislation would 
become law, at least in the near future. 
 
C.  Economic Scenarios under Climate Change Legislation 
Cap and trade legislation has consequences for the whole of the U.S. economy. Analysis 
of the legislation therefore requires a flexible, comprehensive model of the U.S. economy, 
including a very detailed modeling of the energy industry. The Energy Information 
Administration’s (EIA) National Energy Modeling System (EIA-NEMS) is such a model. EIA-NEMS 
tracks economic output, wages, prices, and employment in dozens in of industries and is used 
to produce the Department of Energy’s periodic energy sector outlooks. Such an outlook, in the 
absence of regulation, forms the reference case for EIA analysis using the EIA-NEMS model. The 
EIA-NEMS model also was utilized to model the expected impacted of climate change 
legislation on the U.S. economy. Economic activity and energy prices under climate change 
regulation could be compared with similar values in the reference case scenario, in order to 
isolate the consequences of climate change regulation on the economy. Specifically, the EIA 
conducted analysis of both the Waxman-Markey legislation in the U.S. House of 
Representatives and the Kerry-Lieberman legislation in the U.S. Senate.  
The baseline regulated scenario in the EIA modeling assumes that low-emissions 
technologies (renewables, nuclear power) are “developed and deployed on a large scale” 
during the study period, and that there is ample supply of both domestic and international 
offsets available for purchase (EIA, 2009). The model also assumed that polluters would curtail 
emissions at a greater rate than required in order to amass a bank of emissions allowances that 
could be used at later date. This behavior is anticipated because the requirements and costs for 
reducing greenhouse emissions become even stricter in the future (EIA, 2009). In the baseline 
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model, most of the reductions in greenhouse gas emissions through 2030 are achieved by 
reducing emissions in energy production, and the vast majority of these reductions occur in 
electric power through a decline in conventional coal power electricity production (EIA, 2009). 
This occurs as low- or no-emissions technologies replace conventional coal capacity or as 
declines in demand for electric power are met by reducing conventional coal production.  
The Energy Information Administration in its analysis considered multiple alternative 
scenarios. In its analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation, the following were 5 alternative 
scenarios (EIA, 2009). The first alternative scenario is the “No Bank Case,” which releases the 
assumption that polluters bank pollution allowances for later use. The second case is the “High 
Offset” case which assumes that international offsets can be quickly identified and used by 
polluters. Both of these alternative scenarios should allow less costly compliance and lead to a 
smaller decline in economic activity under the Waxman-Markey legislation. By contrast, the 
“High Cost” case assumes that it is 50% more costly to utilize no- or low-emissions technologies, 
while the “No International” case assumes that international offsets are not available to U.S. 
polluters. The last scenario, the “No International/Limited” case assumes there are no 
international offsets and no marginal improvement in the adoption of no- or low-emissions 
technology. It will be particularly expensive to the economy to meet emissions caps under this 
scenario. Note that a similar set of alternative scenarios also were considered in the EIA analysis 
of the Kerry-Lieberman Senate legislation (EIA, 2010). Note also that the EIA models did not 
consider any economic benefits from climate change legislation for the period under study. As 
was discussed earlier, such benefits are more uncertain and are difficult to quantify. The focus 
of the EIA modeling, as discussed in Chapter 2 of this report, was to consider the economic 
“price” of regulating greenhouse gas emissions. 
Looking across all of these scenarios, the two most important cost factors are: 1) the 
availability of cost effective low- or no-carbon production technologies; or 2) the cost of 
purchasing offsets that allow continued production using more carbon-intense technologies. 
Thus, among the alternative scenarios, the “No International/Limited” scenario will by far have 
the greatest potential to raise energy costs and reduce the size of the U.S. economy. 
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Table 3.1 shows results from the EIA’s analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation and 
the Kerry-Lieberman legislation. All impacts are reported relative to the reference case 
scenario, which factors in normal expectations for inflation. Recall that this reference scenario 
represents projections for the economy and the energy industry in the absence of climate 
change legislation. Therefore, results show how much each scenario affects the economy 
relative to this unregulated reference case. Results are presented as percentage changes in 
GDP, the price of electricity, electricity generation, and industrial production. 
 
Table 3.1 
Economic Consequences of Cap and Trade Programs by Scenario in the EIA-NEMS Reports 
        
Variable Base Case High Cost 
No 
Int'l/Limited 
 
Base Case High Cost 
No 
Int'l/Limited 
        
  
2020 
   
2030 
 Waxman-Markey 
       Electricity Price 2.6% 4.1% 15.3% 
 
19.5% 29.2% 77.4% 
Electricity Generation -2.4% -2.7% -5.9% 
 
-7.1% -9.3% -16.6% 
Gross Domestic Product -0.3% -0.5% -0.7% 
 
-0.8% -1.1% -2.3% 
Industrial Shipments -1.0% -1.0% -2.8% 
 
-2.5% -2.7% -6.8% 
        
  
2020   
  
2035 
 Kerry-Lieberman 
       Electricity Price 4.4% 5.7% 20.9% 
 
25.7% 32.8% 84.8% 
Electricity Generation -1.3% -1.7% -5.8% 
 
-4.5% -5.9% -13.7% 
Gross Domestic Product 0.0% -0.1% -0.7% 
 
-0.4% -0.6% -1.8% 
Industrial Activity -0.6% -0.7% -2.7% 
 
-2.8% -3.2% -7.7% 
  Source: EIA 2009 and EIA 2010 
 
Analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation runs through the year 2030. This was as far 
out into the future that EIA-NEMS extended as of that year. By the year 2010, the EIA-NEMS 
model was expanded to run through 2035. As a result, the analysis of the Kerry-Lieberman 
legislation, which occurred during 2010, ran through the year 2035.  
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Note that the size of the estimated economic consequences varies more by scenario 
than between the two pieces of legislation. With the exception of electricity prices, results are 
relatively modest in both the Base Case and High Cost scenarios, whether these scenarios were 
used to analyze the Waxman-Markey legislation or the Kerry-Lieberman legislation. Economic 
costs rise substantially, however, when comparing the economic consequences of the No 
International/Limited scenario. This scenario, with both limited access to offsets and limited 
ability to substitute towards no- or low-emissions production technologies, generates relatively 
large consequences for energy prices, energy generation, GDP, and Industrial Shipments 
whether under the Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Lieberman legislation. Results also grew 
substantially from 2020 to either 2030/2035. As argued below, the larger results in these latter 
years may be the most instructive findings. 
In particular, when examining model results it is important to focus on results from the 
year 2030 or year 2035. Rather than representing an outlier at the end of the analysis period, 
the results for 2030/2035 may be the most representative of the cost of greenhouse gas 
regulation. Results for the year 2030/2035 occur after the expiration of free-allowances. As a 
result, economic impacts in 2030/2035 more accurately reflect the regulatory costs determined 
by the availability of offsets and the potential to substitute towards renewable energy, nuclear 
energy, or other no- or low-emissions technologies. This is especially true because after 2030 an 
increasing share of the greenhouse gas emissions reductions will need to come from outside of 
the electricity generation sector, and there is even less technological progress in this area (EIA, 
2009). The practical implication of this is that the reader should put substantial weight on 
2030/2305 cost estimates when evaluating EIA-NEMS model outputs for the 2015 to 2030/2035 
period.   
 The lost economic activity, whether electricity generation, GDP, or Industrial Shipments, 
doubles or more than doubles under the No International/Limited scenario compared to the 
Base Case scenario. The loss in electricity generation is between 13.7% and 16.6% in 2030/2035 
in the No International/Limited scenario. The overall decline in gross domestic product under 
this scenario is 1.8% to 2.3% in 2030/2035. Industrial Shipments decline by 6.8% to 7.7% in 
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2030/2035 in the No International/Limited scenario. These are substantial declines. In terms of 
GDP, these declines are roughly equal to a year of GDP growth. Greenhouse gas regulation has 
the potential to cause a loss of 1-year of GDP growth by 2030/2035. Declines in electric 
generation and industrial shipments are much more severe. The larger effect occurs for 
industrial shipments since this industry is among the largest and most intense users of energy.  
While not listed in the Table, we note that the price of emissions allowances in 2030 under the 
No International/Limited scenario is 190.5 2007$ per metric ton of CO2 equivalent under the 
Waxman-Markey legislation, and 184.8 2008$ per metric CO2 equivalent under the Kerry-
Lieberman legislation.  
  
D.  Other Studies and Impact on U.S. Manufacturing 
Besides the EIA analysis, we reviewed private sector studies examining proposed climate 
legislation.  One was the American Council for Capital Formation/National Association of 
Manufacturers study (ACCF/NAM, 2009). The ACCF/NAM study utilized two additional scenarios 
to analyze the Waxman-Markey legislation using the EIA-NEMS model. The study then reported 
the resulting economic consequences. The ACCF/NAM study developed a “Low” and “High” 
scenario for examination. However, in the context of the Energy Information Administration 
Report, the assumptions of both the Low and High scenario in the ACCF/NAM are both similar 
to the No International/Limited scenario in the EIA study (EIA-NEMS, 2009). In particular, the 
ACCF/NAM assumes that there will be fewer offsets available to greenhouse gas emitters than 
under the EIA-NEMS Base Case scenario and limits on the adoption of no- or low-emissions 
technologies, as in the No International/Limited scenario. This was the scenario that included 
two developments that were not part of the baseline analysis. The ACCF-NEM Low and High 
Cost scenarios differ in assumptions about the adoption of these technologies. The High Cost 
scenario is more restrictive in assumptions about the adoption of nuclear, biomass, and wind 
energy.  
 Table 3.2 shows the projected economic consequences of the Waxman-Markey 
legislation using the ACCF/NAM Low and High Cost scenarios. Results are presented for a 
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similar set of economic measures as in Table 3.1, though the ACCF/NAM report also provides 
estimates for the projected impacted on manufacturing employment. The ACCF/NAM report 
shows smaller increases in residential energy prices than in the EIA No International/Limited 
scenario, but still shows substantial prices increases by the year 2030 of 31.4% in the Low Cost 
scenario and 50.0% in the High Cost scenario. The consequences for GDP are a 1.8% decline in 
2030 under the Low Cost scenario and 2.4% under the High Cost scenario. These losses also are 
similar to those found in the No International/Limited Case in the EIA analysis.  
Results in Table 3.2 also show how much more severe the expected impact of 
comprehensive climate change legislation is on the U.S. manufacturing sector. For example, in 
2030, total employment is expected to be 1.1% to 1.5% less than in the reference scenario 
under the Waxman-Markey legislation. By contrast, manufacturing employment would be 5.8% 
to 7.3% less under the Waxman-Markey legislation compared to the reference scenario. The 
employment impact would be concentrated in the manufacturing sector. This is particularly 
evident if you consider that manufacturing employment accounts for around 10% of all 
employment. The 5.8% to 7.3% decline in manufacturing employment would reflect a 0.6% to 
0.7% decline in total employment, or about half of the total decline.  
The significant decline in manufacturing activity is also evident in results for the 
industrial output variable. In 2030, the ACCF/NAM report anticipates a 5.3% to 6.5% decline in 
industrial output under the Waxman-Markey legislation compared to the reference scenario. 
Similar declines were anticipated for industrial activity in the EIA analysis under the No 
International/Limited scenario (the scenario most comparable to the ACCF/NAM analysis). The 
EIA predicted a 6.8% decline in industrial activity in 2030 as a result of the Waxman-Markey 
legislation and a 7.7% decline in industrial activity under the Kerry-Lieberman legislation. 
 Looking across all of the measures, analysis has predicted a decline of manufacturing 
ranging from 5.8% to 7.7% under the comprehensive climate change regulation. This result 
makes sense given that many manufacturing businesses use production methods that are 
energy-intensive, manufacturing businesses have an intensive demand for transportation 
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services, manufacturers are exposed to significant international competition, and some 
manufacturing plants have their own greenhouse gas emissions.   
 
Table 3.2 
Economic Consequences of Cap and Trade Programs by Scenario in the ACCF/NAM Report 
    
 
  
Variable Low Cost High Cost 
 
 
Low Cost High Cost 
    
 
  
  
2020 
 
 
 
2030 
Waxman-Markey 
   
 
  Employment 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 -1.1% -1.5% 
Gross Domestic Product (Millions 2007$) -0.2% -0.4% 
 
  -1.8%  -2.4% 
Retail Electricity Price ($/KWH) 4.9% 7.9% 
 
 31.4% 50.0% 
Industrial Output -1.8% -2.2% 
 
  -5.3%  -6.5% 
Manufacturing Employment -1.8% -2.3% 
 
  -5.8%  -7.3% 
Source: American Council for Capital Formation and National Association of Manufacturers 
 
E.  Impact on U.S. Agriculture 
The impact of comprehensive climate legislation or regulations on U.S. agriculture is 
substantial and widespread, but is also very dependent on the exact provisions that may be 
enacted. Climate legislation or regulation would generate new costs for agriculture but may 
also generate benefits. The exact magnitude of these costs and benefits depends on the exact 
provisions of legislation or regulation. This section reviews the potential costs, potential 
benefits, and the net costs of climate legislation for U.S. agriculture.  
 
Potential Costs 
Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions that drive up costs in carbon-intensive 
industries and inputs such as transportation and energy could have a substantial effect on 
agricultural input costs. Increased production and marketing costs would hurt the agricultural 
sector in both the short and long run. The increased costs could also reduce production over 
time and drive up agricultural commodity prices, partly offsetting the increased costs to 
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agriculture, but also passing on increased costs to consumers. Regulations could also directly 
affect agriculture if the sector is subject to emissions controls or costs for greenhouse emissions 
from either crop or livestock operations. Both the Waxman-Markey and Kerry-Lieberman 
legislative bills exempted agriculture from emissions regulations, and the initial target of any 
EPA regulations appears to not be agriculture, but potential regulations on agriculture in the 
future are unknown under either approach. 
 Two studies of the initial House legislation provide an estimate of the potential impact 
of climate legislation and higher energy prices on agriculture. These studies predicted impacts 
out to the year 2050, and therefore offer a longer timeframe than the EIA analysis. The Food 
and Agricultural Policy Research Institute (FAPRI) at the University of Missouri used increased 
energy cost estimates from CRA International to calculate the impact of climate legislation on 
agricultural input costs. The estimated increased energy prices from CRA International included 
motor fuel that is 4% higher than current baseline projections by 2020 and 11% by 2050; 
natural gas that is 11% higher relative to baseline by 2020 and 34% higher by 2050; and 
electricity that is 16% higher relative to baseline by 2020 and 45% by 2050. The FAPRI analysis 
used several Missouri representative farms as the point of comparison and showed resulting 
increases of 3-7% on fertilizer costs by 2020 and 9-19% by 2050 relative to a 2009 baseline 
level. Fertilizer costs for corn are at the high end of the range, while soybeans are at the low 
end of the range. The differences in cost increase are primarily based on the differences in 
fertilizer use, particularly nitrogen. Natural gas is the predominant cost component in the 
production of anhydrous ammonia, which is a primary source of nitrogen fertilizer and natural 
gas price increases would be passed on through nitrogen fertilizer price increases. Machinery, 
drying, and irrigation energy costs rise in line with motor fuel and natural gas costs and increase 
4% and 12% over 2009 baseline levels by 2020 and 2050 respectively. Adding these increased 
fertilizer and energy costs to other operating costs shows an increase in total operating costs of 
approximately 2-4% by 2020 and 4-10% by 2050 relative to 2009 baseline levels. 
 Analysis by Bruce Babcock at the Center for Agricultural and Rural Development at Iowa 
State University calculates potential costs on Iowa corn and soybean farms by estimating the 
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carbon cost equivalent for various farm inputs. At a CO2 price of $20 per ton (a short-run price 
level), the emissions costs of diesel fuel usage amounts to about $0.80 per acre per year. 
Emissions from natural gas usage as the primary energy source in fertilizer production similarly 
passed through as an increased cost of $2.85 per acre. And, and propane usage for grain drying 
resulted in an emissions cost that averaged $0.87 per acre ($1.75 per acre for corn and $0 per 
acre for soybeans). The total increased cost for fuel and fertilizer of $4.52 per acre represents 
about a 1.5% increase from operating cost levels of around $300 per acre. 
 Both studies suggest small overall changes in crop production costs in the short run due 
to climate legislation and greenhouse gas emissions costs. Increased energy costs imply similar 
modest increases in livestock production costs as well. Several other studies generally confirm 
the expected costs increases and their relatively minor levels of increase, but applying expected 
energy cost changes to aggregate U.S. farm cost data shows the significance of even small 
changes in costs. Farm income and cost data from the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Economic Research Service shows the impact of cost changes relative to 2009 baseline 
levels for three energy-sensitive cost categories and total farm costs and income. 
 
Table 3.3 
U.S. Aggregate Farm Cost Estimates 
 
        
 
           
 
2009       2020 (Short Run) 
 
          2050 (Long Run) 
 
Baseline Assumed Cost 
 
Assumed Cost 
 
Level 
Increase 
Increase Above 
Baseline 
 
Increase 
Increase Above 
Baseline 
Category (Million 2009 $) (%) (Million 2009$) 
 
(%) (Million 2009$) 
Fertilizer $20,136 6% $1,208 
 
15% $3,020 
Fuel and Oil $12,716 4% $508 
 
11% $1,399 
Electricity $4,590 16% $727 
 
45% $2,045 
 
 
     Total Energy-Intensive Costs $37,441 
 
$2,444 
  
$6,464 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and author’s calculations 
  
 The estimated cost increases of $2.4 billion (2009$) in the short run and $6.4 billion 
(2009$) in the long run relative to baseline levels amount to about 0.9% of all farm costs 
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(purchased inputs, labor, land, capital, and taxes) by 2020 and 2.3% by 2050, but this also 
represents 3.9% and 10.4% of net farm income in the short run and long run respectively. This 
cost analysis overstates the negative impact on agricultural profitability of energy price 
increases due to climate legislation. As noted in the explanation of potential costs, the 
increased costs will lead to some contraction of supply and result in higher commodity prices 
that are passed on to the consumer and offset some of the increased costs to agriculture. In 
addition, EPA analysis of the proposed legislation suggests smaller increases in fertilizer prices 
in the short run due to transitional allowances provided to energy-intensive and trade-exposed 
industries. On the other hand, the cost estimates above do not consider the long-run effects of 
changes in crop or enterprise mix due to energy price changes or the relative changes in costs 
across countries that adopt similar climate legislation. Countries that do not adopt similar 
climate regulations could gain a significant competitive advantage in production costs that 
translates into some international shifts in agricultural production. And, the analysis assumes 
agriculture is affected by climate legislation only through the impact on energy prices and 
energy inputs in agriculture. Direct regulation of emissions in agriculture could add substantial 
costs for the industry. Finally, the cost analysis does not consider any potential changes on 
productivity or costs due to changes in climate associated with greenhouse gas emissions, nor 
does it consider any productivity losses or costs avoided due to climate legislation or regulation. 
Some studies have attempted to address the potential impact of increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations on agricultural productivity, but this analysis is confined to a static assessment 
of marginal cost changes under potential legislation or regulation. 
 
 Potential Benefits 
 Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions could also benefit the agricultural sector if 
increased costs on emissions translated into increased demand for reduced-emission biofuels 
such as ethanol (both starch-based and cellulosic-based) or biodiesel. The biofuels industry has 
grown substantially in the past few years, thanks in part to a complex mix of changing 
technology and economics along with substantial government policies focused both on financial 
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and environmental aspects of the industry. Greenhouse gas regulations that impose caps or 
costs on emissions could further impact growth in the sector, with or without additional 
policies. Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions may also benefit agriculture by rewarding 
carbon sequestration efforts that include management practices such as conservation tillage, 
nutrient management, or animal waste management, as well as land use practices such as the 
establishment or maintenance of grassland or forest. These agricultural practices could be 
directly rewarded through the value of carbon emission offsets in a carbon market (such as 
through cap and trade). In addition, an increase in land devoted to grassland or forestry could 
reduce other U.S. agricultural production and drive up agricultural commodity prices. Lower 
U.S. production and higher commodity prices could encourage agricultural production increases 
worldwide, partially offsetting the price effect, but constraints on U.S. production would likely 
lead to lower total global agricultural output and higher commodity prices. 
 The proposed legislation would have provided major benefits to agriculture through an 
opportunity to provide carbon offsets in the carbon market established by cap and trade 
provisions along with no direct regulation of agricultural emissions. The EPA analysis considered 
only some potential agricultural opportunities to provide carbon offsets. It showed a 50% 
increase in amount of conservation tillage on cropland by 2020 based on an initial allowance 
price of $15-per-ton CO2 rising at a real rate of 5% per year. Further analysis and testimony by 
Joseph Glauber, Chief Economists for the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), 
before the U.S. House Committee on Agriculture Subcommittee on Conservation, Credit, 
Energy, and Research confirms the primary opportunity for agriculture to earn carbon offset 
income is in forestry. The USDA analysis is based on models of agricultural and forestry 
responses to the potential changes in greenhouse gas emissions regulations and the market for 
emissions offsets. Projected increases in prices for emissions offsets suggest an increase of 16.6 
million acres in forest by 2020 and 59 million acres by 2050, with approximately 35 million acres 
coming from existing cropland and 24 million acres from pasture. The afforestation changes 
would generate $2 billion per year in agricultural offset income by 2020 and $24 billion year by 
2050 (2004$), representing more than 80% of all agricultural offset income. The analysis 
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conducted by USDA discusses shifts from cropland and pasture to forestry, but does not discuss 
the fate of land enrolled in the Conservation Reserve Program CRP). Approximately 31 million 
acres are currently enrolled in the CRP, a federal program that pays producers an annual rental 
payment to temporarily retire cropland and other high-priority land from production. This land 
could be a target for additional carbon sequestration activities or it could return to cropping as 
other acres shift to forestry. But, current USDA policy appears focused on maintaining 
enrollment in the CRP near its 32 million acre authorization, thus substantial acreage shifts out 
of the CRP are not projected in the analysis. 
 In addition to the direct income from carbon sequestration practices, the predicted 
reduction in agricultural production due to the combination of higher energy prices, changes in 
production practices, and changes in land use are significant. Major field crop production rises 
for one crop (grain sorghum, likely due to acreage tradeoffs with corn), but falls for the rest by 
0.4-11.4% by 2020. By 2050, production falls by 10.2-31.5% for all of the major field crops. As a 
result, crop prices rise from 8.1-56.5% by 2050 relative to a baseline scenario. Livestock 
production suffers as well, falling 0.7-7.9% by 2020 and 2.1-22.7% by 2050 relative to the 
baseline scenario. Corresponding livestock and livestock product prices increase by 2.2-9.0% by 
2020 and 14.9-33.1% by 2050 relative to the baseline scenario. The reduced production in the 
United States could be partially offset by increased production worldwide in response to higher 
prices and potential competitive production differences based on different costs or regulatory 
requirements. But, as noted above, constraints on U.S. production would likely lead to lower 
total global agricultural output and higher commodity prices. These higher prices would provide 
further benefits to U.S. agriculture, but once again would pass on increased costs to consumers.   
 
 Net Impact on U.S. Agriculture 
 The net impact of potential climate legislation or regulation on the profitability of 
agriculture is very dependent on the exact provisions of proposed rules as well as the 
assumptions and modeling parameters used to study the sector. Studies in general have found 
relatively small increases in production costs due to higher energy costs and through higher 
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energy costs passed through in higher fertilizer costs. Studies that model the resulting 
production adjustments show small decreases in production and increases in price that partially 
offset the higher energy costs. More significantly, the studies of potential legislation or 
regulation assume large gains for agriculture based on the assumption that agriculture will not 
be subject to regulations, but instead will be eligible to provide carbon offsets and earn income 
from carbon sequestration activities. The USDA testimony by Glauber estimated the overall 
annualized value on producer surplus or farm income from proposed climate regulations at $22 
billion per year (in 2004 inflation-adjusted dollars). Adjusting to 2009 for reference, the $22 
billion would be equal to approximately $25 billion in 2009 dollars, which is approximately 40% 
of the 2009 U.S. net farm income of $62 billion. 
 In summary, this analysis of existing research generally confirms that U.S. agriculture 
would benefit from climate legislation and regulation. The analysis does not consider potential 
costs if agriculture is regulated instead of exempted. Nor does the analysis address the 
potential benefits to agriculture or to society in general of taking actions that may mitigate 
climate change or maintain agricultural productivity. But, the economic analysis does suggest 
the gains are largely dependent on carbon offset revenues and increased commodity prices 
from reduced U.S. agricultural production. And these gains to U.S. agriculture come at the 
expense of consumers in the form of reduced supplies and higher prices. 
 
F.  Economic Consequences under Direct Environmental Protection Agency Regulation 
The precise nature of planned EPA regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is not known. 
The EPA has discussed plans to regulate a group of larger greenhouse gas emitters, but a 
specific formal set of procedures has not been announced. Plans that have been discussed 
suggest significant actions to reduce emissions by major current emitters. This implies that 
there would be some of the economic costs identified above for cap and trade legislation, 
including a reduction in generating capacity for conventional coal and increases in other types 
of electric power capacity. There also would likely be an associated increase in electricity prices 
with a negative impact on economic activity. However, it is unclear whether the magnitude of 
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these changes will be smaller, the same, or even larger than the changes anticipated under the 
Waxman-Markey or Kerry-Lieberman climate change legislation. As a result, we do not provide 
specific estimates of economic consequences for the case of direct EPA regulation.    
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Chapter 4: Economic Consequences in Nebraska 
Nebraska has a diversified economy, so in many ways the impacts of climate change 
legislation and regulation on the Nebraska economy will be similar to their impacts on the 
national economy. However, the Nebraska economy differs from the national economy in a 
number of important ways that will cause impacts to diverge. The first is that Nebraska has a 
large agricultural sector that may have substantial opportunities to provide emission offsets. 
The second is that Nebraska’s mix of energy producing assets is different than the national 
average, so that the impact of climate change legislation on Nebraska utilities and energy prices 
may differ as well. The third is that Nebraska has a lower concentration of the types of heavy 
manufacturing industries that are most disadvantaged by climate legislation. This Chapter 
addresses each of these issues and then examines several studies that have directly estimated 
the impact of proposed cap and trade legislation on the state of Nebraska or regions within the 
state.  
 
A.  Generating Capacity 
 As noted earlier, caps on or regulation of greenhouse gas emissions will curtail or 
encourage various modes of generating electric power. In particular, analyses, whether from 
the Energy Information Administration (EIA) or the American Council for Capital 
Formation/National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-NEMS), expected a significant decline 
in conventional coal generating capacity under climate change legislation relative to the 
reference case scenario. However, declining conventional coal generation also would be 
replaced by other types of generation capacity. The ACCF-NEMS analysis, which generally 
assumed limited growth in nuclear or renewable fuels capacity, predicted steep increases in 
natural gas generating capacity. The EIA analysis reached a similar conclusion under its 
scenarios that assumed limited growth in nuclear or renewable fuels capacity.  Under EIA 
scenarios that assumed rapid adoption of nuclear or renewable generation capacity, however, 
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the EIA predicted rapidly growing shares for nuclear power and renewables and little change in 
natural gas capacity.  
 With the movement away from conventional coal capacity, a natural question for 
Nebraskans is whether generating capacity in this state is likely to be more or less impacted by 
climate change legislation or other efforts to limit greenhouse gas emissions? This will depend 
on the particular features of Nebraska generating facilities, but a rough analysis is possible by 
looking at the current structure of generating capacity in Nebraska and the United States. This 
is done in Table 4.1, which shows the share of generating capacity by type for the United States 
and for Nebraska. Looking at broad categories, Nebraska and the United States have just under 
70% of generating capacity in fossil fuels (such as coal or natural gas), and just over 30% in 
nuclear power, hydroelectric, and renewable sources such as wind, solar, or biomass. The 
primary difference between Nebraska and the United States is that Nebraska has a relatively 
large share of capacity in conventional coal and a relatively small share of electric power 
capacity in natural gas. The larger share of conventional coal production in Nebraska suggests 
that a larger share of Nebraska generating capacity will be at risk of closure or reduced activity 
under climate change legislation. This may even imply that electricity prices would be impacted 
more in Nebraska than the nation as a whole, though electricity price increases will ultimately 
result from the complex interaction of many factors. 
 
Table 4.1 
2008 Sources of Electric Power Generating Capacity in the United States and Nebraska 
 
  Percentage of Generation Megawatt Hours 
Energy Source United States Nebraska 
Coal 48.2% 66.3% 
Natural Gas 21.4% 2.3% 
Nuclear 19.6% 29.3% 
Hydroelectric 6.2% 1.1% 
Wind, Solar, Biomass, 
Geothermal 3.1% 0.9% 
Other 1.5% 0.1% 
Source: Energy Information Administration 
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 The impact on electricity prices is critical for households and energy-intensive industries 
of all kinds. The impacts may be especially critical for manufacturing businesses, since a 
significant share of manufacturing businesses are intensive users of energy. The impact on 
manufacturing in Nebraska is discussed in more detail in the next section. 
 
B.  Economic Consequences for Nebraska Manufacturing 
Nebraska has a smaller share of its gross state product in manufacturing than the United 
States overall. Manufacturing accounted for 10.7% of Nebraska gross state product in 2009 
versus 11.1% of U.S. gross domestic product. This point alone suggests that economic 
consequences of climate change legislation and regulation on the Nebraska economy may be 
somewhat less severe than nationally. More importantly, Nebraska also has a smaller share of 
its manufacturing activity in industries most vulnerable to decline as a result of cap and trade 
legislation, or other efforts to regulate greenhouse gas emissions, as is evident in Tables 4.2 and 
4.3 below.    
Table 4.2 contains data from the American Council for Capital Formation/National 
Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-NEM) study. That study included an estimate of the decline 
in industrial activity, as measured by shipments, in 20 specific manufacturing industries. Table 
4.2 presents the projected loss in industry shipments in 2030 due to the Waxman-Markey 
legislation. Manufacturing industries are ranked according to the severity of the loss. All but 3 
of 20 industries lose shipments. Primary metals lose nearly 30% of shipments under the High 
Cost scenario and stone, clay, and glass products losses nearly 20% of shipments. Altogether, 
the ACCF-NEM report expects that 7 of 20 industries will lose more than 10% of shipments in 
2030, at least in the High Cost Scenario. Note that Nebraska has a smaller share of employment 
in 6 of these 7 industries. Altogether, these 7 industries account for 35.5% of all manufacturing 
employment in the United States, compared to 27.1% of Nebraska manufacturing employment. 
At the same time, Nebraska has 37.4% of employment in food products, more than three times 
the national average. Shipments in this manufacturing industry are expected to decline by just 
3.4% in 2030, even in the High Cost scenario.  
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Table 4.2 
Nebraska Manufacturing Employment in Hard Hit Manufacturing Industries 
 
      Percent Loss in 
 
         Percentage of  
 
 Industrial Shipments 
 
     Manufacturing Jobs 
Manufacturing Industry Low Cost High Cost 
 
Nebraska United States 
Primary Metals Industry -22.5% -29.2% 
 
1.8% 3.3% 
Stone, Clay, and Glass Products -14.1% -18.2% 
 
2.8% 3.5% 
Machinery -12.4% -15.5% 
 
10.4% 8.8% 
Apparel -11.2% -15.4% 
 
0.1% 1.3% 
Electrical Equipment -9.3% -11.8% 
 
2.4% 3.1% 
Transportation Equipment -8.1% -11.1% 
 
7.5% 11.7% 
Wood Products -8.0% -10.9% 
 
2.1% 3.8% 
Petroleum and Coal Products -8.9% -9.2% 
 
0.1% 0.8% 
Fabricated Metal Products -6.2% -7.8% 
 
8.9% 12.1% 
Chemical Manufacturing -5.8% -7.3% 
 
3.6% 6.2% 
Computers and Electronics -5.8% -6.9% 
 
4.2% 7.7% 
Paper Products -5.1% -6.5% 
 
1.4% 3.2% 
Textile Mills and Products -4.2% -5.7% 
 
0.5% 2.3% 
Beverages and Tobacco Products -3.2% -4.0% 
 
0.4% 1.2% 
Food Products -2.5% -3.4% 
 
37.4% 11.2% 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing -1.0% -1.0% 
 
5.0% 5.0% 
Printing -0.1% -0.1% 
 
3.6% 4.8% 
Leather and Leather Products 0.0% 0.0% 
 
0.2% 0.2% 
Furniture and Related Products 2.9% 4.4% 
 
2.2% 3.7% 
Plastics and Rubber Products 7.5% 5.2% 
 
5.4% 6.3% 
Source: ACCF-NEM (2009) and County Business Patterns 2008  
 
Table 4.3 lists Nebraska and United States employment in a group of manufacturing and 
mining industries thought to be “Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries”(Interagency 
Report, 2009). These manufacturing and mining industries were identified to be especially 
vulnerable to decline under the Waxman-Markey legislation. As the name suggests, these 
industries would face significant cost challenges due to rising energy prices and would face 
significant competition from rivals located in countries without such comprehensive 
greenhouse gas regulation. Firms in such industries are scheduled to receive additional 
emissions allowances in the first 15 years of Waxman-Markey implementation, but would 
ultimately face rising costs.  
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Table 4.3 
2008 Nebraska and U.S. Employment in Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries 
 
             Nebraska       United States 
 
            Employment Employment 
NAICS Code: Description 2008 
 
2008 
212210: Iron Ore Mining 0 
 
5,018 
212234: Copper Ore and Nickel Ore Mining 0 
 
9,379 
312213: Malt manufacturing 0 
 
900 
311221: Wet Corn Milling 0 
 
11,279 
311613: Rendering and Meat Byproduct Processing 440 
 
9,451 
314992: Yarn Spinning Mills 60 
 
22,668 
314992: Tire Cord and Tire Fabric Mills 0 
 
3,318 
321219: Reconstituted Wood Product Manufacturing 0 
 
18,536 
322110: Pulp Mills 0 
 
7,030 
322121: Paper (except Newsprint) Mills 10 
 
74,115 
322122: Newsprint Mills 10 
 
4,804 
322130: Paperboard Mills 10 
 
37,419 
325110: Petrochemical Manufacturing 0 
 
9,084 
325131: Inorganic Dye and Pigment Manufacturing 0 
 
7,324 
325181: Alkalies and Chlorine Manufacturing  0 
 
7,500 
325182: Carbon Black Manufacturing 0 
 
1,696 
325188: All Other Basic Inorganic Chemical Manufacturing 156 
 
37,916 
325192: Cyclic Crude and Intermediate Manufacturing 0 
 
3,335 
325199: All Other Basic Organic Chemical Manufacturing 140 
 
72,332 
325211: Plastic Material and Resin Manufacturing 69 
 
72,878 
325212: Synthetic Rubber Manufacturing 0 
 
9,638 
325221: Cellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing  0 
 
1,474 
325222: Noncellulosic Organic Fiber Manufacturing 0 
 
15,423 
325311: Nitrogenous Fertilizer Manufacturing 60 
 
3,943 
327111: Vitreous China Plumbing Fixtures and China 10 
 
4,081 
327112: Vitreous China, Fine Earthenware, and Other  10 
 
7,947 
327113: Porcelain Electrical Supply Manufacturing 0 
 
5,387 
327122: Ceramic Wall and Floor Tile Manufacturing 100 
 
6,444 
327123: Other Structural Clay Product Manufacturing 0 
 
1,456 
327125: Nonclay Refractory Manufacturing 0 
 
4,860 
327211: Flat Glass Manufacturing 0 
 
10,403 
327212: Other Pressed and Blown Glass and Glassware  37 
 
21,171 
327213: Glass Container Manufacturing 0 
 
17,500 
327310: Cement Manufacturing 175 
 
17,648 
327410: Lime Manufacturing 0 
 
4,562 
327992: Ground or Treated Mineral and Earth 0 
 
6,735 
327993: Mineral Wool Manufacturing 0 
 
17,856 
Source: 2008 County Business Patterns 
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Table 4.3 (Continued) 
2008 Nebraska and U.S. Employment in Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industries 
 
             Nebraska       United States 
 
            Employment Employment 
NAICS Code: Description 2008 
 
2008 
331111: Iron and Steel Mills 392 
 
107,066 
331112: Electrometallurgical Ferroalloy Products 0 
 
2,518 
331210: Iron and Steel Pipe and Tube Manufacturing 0 
 
18,275 
331311: Alumina Refining 0 
 
1,625 
331312: Primary Aluminum Production 0 
 
9,176 
331411: Primary Smelting and Refining of Copper 0 
 
1,580 
331419: Primary Smelting and Refining of Nonferous Metal 0 
 
7,608 
331511: Iron Foundries 244 
 
49,276 
335991: Carbon and Graphite Product Manufacturing 0 
 
8,598 
Total Energy-Intensive, Trade-Exposed Industry Employment 1,918 
 
778,231 
    All Manufacturing  104,997 
 
13,096,157 
All Mining 884 
 
629,271 
Share of Manufacturing and Mining 1.8% 
 
5.7% 
Source: 2008 County Business Patterns 
*Numbers have been rounded 
 
Employment figures from the 2008 County Business Patterns Report of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce are reported in Table 4.3 for both Nebraska and the United States. 
Table 4.3 also shows Nebraska and United States employment in these energy-intensive, trade-
exposed industries as a share of all manufacturing and mining employment.  These industries 
account for just 1.8% of Nebraska manufacturing and mining employment, but 5.7% of United 
States manufacturing and mining employment. The share is more than 3 times as high for the 
U.S. than for Nebraska.  
Both Tables 4.2 and 4.3 suggest that the losses in manufacturing activity due to cap and 
trade legislation or other regulation of greenhouse gases will not be as severe in Nebraska as 
nationwide. That said, rising energy prices and direct cost impacts will be quite significant for 
many individual Nebraska manufacturers, particularly in hard hit industries such as primary 
metals production, glass production, and machinery manufacturers. Overall, however, the 
decline in manufacturing activity relative to the unregulated case in 2030 may be more in the 
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4% to 6% range rather than the 6% to 8% range projected nationally from sources such as EIA 
and ACCF-NEM.  
 
C.  Economic Consequences for Nebraska Agriculture 
 The estimated impact of climate legislation or regulation on U.S. agriculture provides 
some insight into the potential effects of legislation or regulation on Nebraska agriculture. 
 
 Potential Costs  
 Regulations on greenhouse gas emissions that drive up transportation and energy costs 
will in turn drive up agricultural input costs in Nebraska in both the short and long run. The 
studies and cost estimates referenced in the analysis of U.S. agricultural impacts also provide 
some guidance on the scale of impacts on Nebraska. Nebraska costs for 2009 for selected 
energy-intensive input categories were pulled from the same USDA Economic Research Service 
database as used for national analysis. Assuming the same percentage increases from the 
earlier analysis, projected cost increases relative to baseline levels in Nebraska in the short and 
long run are shown in Table 4.4. 
 
Table 4.4 
Nebraska Aggregate Farm Cost Estimates 
 
        
 
           
 
2009       2020 (Short Run) 
 
          2050 (Long Run) 
 
Baseline Assumed Cost 
 
Assumed Cost 
 
Level 
Increase 
Increase Above 
Baseline 
 
Increase 
Increase Above 
Baseline 
Category (Million 2009$) (%) (Million 2009$) 
 
(%) ($ Million 2009$) 
Fertilizer $1,210 6% $73 
 
15% $182 
Fuel and Oil $596 4% $24 
 
11% $66 
Electricity $166 16% $31 
 
45% $87 
 
 
     Total Energy-Intensive Costs $1,971 
 
$128 
  
$334 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and author’s calculations 
 The estimated cost increases of $128 million (2009$) in the short run and $334 million 
(2009$) in the long run relative to baseline levels amount to about 0.9% of all farm costs 
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(purchased inputs, labor, land, capital, and taxes) by 2020 and 2.3% by 2050, the same 
percentage as U.S. aggregate farm cost levels. This represents 4.5% and 11.7% of Nebraska’s 
$2.9 billion in 2009 net farm income when analyzing the short run and long run respectively. 
Both percentages are higher than in the U.S. aggregate net farm income comparison earlier. A 
greater concentration in Nebraska of general commodity production and a large livestock 
production sector that operates on smaller profit margins relative to value of production means 
Nebraska generally lives with smaller net farm income margins. Thus, cost increases in 
Nebraska that are similar to U.S. numbers can result in a greater percentage impact on 
Nebraska agriculture’s bottom line. 
 As with the U.S. analysis, these cost estimates likely overstate the negative impact of 
climate legislation or regulation on Nebraska agriculture. At the U.S. level, there are projected 
downward adjustments for both fertilizer usage and major crop acreage. The fertilizer usage 
may fall in Nebraska as well, particularly with the concentration of high-fertilizer-use corn 
acreage in the state. Still, major acreage shifts are likely to occur outside of Nebraska in states 
that are at the margin of major crop production regions. Eastern and Central Nebraska remain 
in the heart of corn and soybean production while Western Nebraska remains in the heart of 
the High Plains wheat production region. The crop acres in Nebraska are not likely to be the 
first to shift out of production, so the increased energy costs will largely be passed on to 
Nebraska producers. The primary offset to these costs will be the projected increase in 
agricultural prices consistent with declines in production primarily in other regions of the 
country. 
 There are other limitations to the analysis that are similar to the discussion of U.S. 
impacts. Potential changes in crop or enterprise mix due to energy price changes or relative 
changes in costs across countries are not assessed. Potential direct regulations of agricultural 
emissions are also not considered, but could be substantial, particularly for Nebraska’s large 
livestock industry. Also, the analysis focuses on changes in profitability due to changes in 
energy prices. The analysis does not consider any potential changes in productivity or costs due 
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to changes in climate associated with greenhouse gas emissions nor does it consider any 
productivity losses or costs avoided due to climate legislation or regulation. 
  
 Potential Benefits 
 Nebraska agriculture is also in line to benefit from some of the potential climate 
legislation or regulations. Nebraska is the second leading producer of ethanol in the United 
States, with nearly 15% of the nation’s current 13.1 million gallons of operating production 
capacity (Renewable Fuels Association and Nebraska Ethanol Board). Any growth in demand for 
reduced-emission biofuels such as ethanol as a result of tighter regulations or higher costs on 
emissions could help Nebraska’s biofuels industry and Nebraska agriculture as the provider of 
feedstocks to the industry. 
 The other primary benefit for Nebraska agriculture is the opportunity to provide carbon 
credits or offsets in a market for greenhouse gas emission allowances. While proposed 
legislation would have established an opportunity for agriculture to provide carbon credits, it is 
not clear whether such an opportunity would be part of any proposed EPA regulations. 
Regardless, an analysis of the potential impact on Nebraska if carbon offsets from agriculture 
are allowed provides some insight in the potential benefits. At the national level, EPA analysis 
of the climate legislation assumed no net increase in carbon sequestration on agricultural lands 
- increased conservation efforts were offset by shifts in land use out of agriculture and into 
forestry. Yet, if the conclusion above regarding minimal shifts in Nebraska acreage holds, then 
Nebraska producers may be able to enhance their management practices to sequester more 
carbon and earn credits for sale in an emissions allowance market. While there are several 
practices that could generate carbon credits, a look at the adoption and maintenance of 
conservation tillage practices and the transition of cropland to permanent grassland provides 
the most insight for this analysis. 
 Research and literature on carbon sequestration through agricultural practices provides 
varied estimates of potential sequestration. A paper from 2002 published in the Journal of Soil 
and Water Conservation by Eve, et al. identified potential sequestration rates for different 
41 
 
practices in the major U.S. agricultural growing regions. The study estimated potential carbon 
sequestration in converting conventional tillage to conservation tillage at 0.40 metric tons (MT) 
of CO2 per acre per year in the Northern Plains region including Nebraska, with a higher rate of 
0.54 MT CO2 per acre per year in the Corn Belt states east of Nebraska. A separate source of 
carbon sequestration rate estimates comes from the contractual standards used by the Chicago 
Climate Exchange (CCX). While the exchange’s trading volume for voluntary offsets has declined 
in the past year, the established protocols that exist for offset contracts sold on the exchange 
provide standard sequestration rates for different practices across the country. For 
conservation tillage, the CCX sets a rate of 0.6 MT CO2 per acre per year for much of the eastern 
United States as well as central and eastern Nebraska and irrigated crop production systems in 
the rest of the state. For the remaining dryland production systems in the state, the rate varies 
between 0.2 and 0.4 MT CO2 per acre per year (assumed at 0.3 MT CO2 per acre per year). 
Nebraska has approximately 18.3 million acres of cultivated crop and hay acres in the state 
(National Agricultural Statistics Service). The breakout of these acres by region is shown in Table 
4.5 along with an estimate of existing conservation tillage practice adoption (based on 
Horowitz, et al.) and calculated carbon sequestration levels. 
 In calculating potential carbon sequestration on Nebraska cropland, one complicating 
factor is whether only new sequestration will be credited or whether existing sequestration 
achieved by “good actors” will also earn credits. Rewarding only new sequestration would apply 
credits only to actual new reductions in emissions, and not rewarding existing efforts would 
create a perverse incentive to till existing conservation acres and then re-introduce them as 
“new” acres that earn credits, while releasing substantial stored carbon in the process. If new 
and existing efforts are rewarded, Nebraska could theoretically earn up to 9.967 million MT CO2 
credits per year. In the short run at an assumed real price of $20 per ton, those credits could be 
worth up to $199 million. In the long run at an assumed real price of $70 per ton, the credits 
could be worth $698 million. In both cases, the carbon offsets would be sufficient to more than 
offset the losses associated with higher energy costs and higher agricultural input costs. 
However, the potential credits are a theoretical ceiling and actual credits could be substantially 
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less based on whether existing practices get any credits and based on the reality that not all 
acres could be effectively converted to conservation tillage to earn carbon credits. 
 There are other credits potentially available. Converting cropland to permanent 
grassland is credited at 1.0 MT CO2 per acre per year in Nebraska in the CCX contract standards. 
If we assume from the earlier discussion that not many Nebraska acres would be converted 
from cropland, then this potential benefit is small. But, Nebraska does have 1.1 million acres 
currently enrolled in the CRP. Of that acreage, approximately 788,000 acres are established in 
grassland. At the CCX rate, those CRP acres could be worth an additional $16 million per year in 
the short run (at the assumed real price of $20 per ton) and $55 million per year in the long run 
(at the assumed real price of $70 per ton). 
 
Table 4.5 
Crop Acres, Conservation Tillage, and Carbon Sequestration in Nebraska 
   
  
   
Category Acres 
Assumed 
Existing  
Conservation 
Tillage  
(Percent) 
 
Carbon 
Sequestration 
Assumed Rate  
(MT CO2/ 
acre/year) 
From  
Existing  
Practices 
(MT CO2 /  
year) 
From 
Potential 
New 
Practices 
(MT CO2 /  
year) 
       Cultivated Crop Acreage 
      Irrigated 7,684,000 75% 
 
0.6 3,457,800 1,152,600 
Dryland - West 1,762,500 75% 
 
0.3 396,563 132,188 
Dryland - Central and East 6,104,100 75% 
 
0.6 2,746,845 915,615 
       Hay Acreage 
      Irrigated 330,000 100% 
 
0.6 198,000 0 
Dryland - West 1,514,000 100% 
 
0.3 454,200 0 
Dryland -  Central and East 856,000 100% 
 
0.6 513,600 0 
       Total 18,250,600 
   
7,767,008 2,200,403 
Source: U.S. Department of Agriculture and author’s calculations 
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 Finally, the biggest potential sequestration nationally is assumed to come from 
afforestation; however, the Eve, et al. study of sequestration rates does not even estimate 
potential carbon sequestration from afforestation in the Northern Plains presumably due to a 
lack of suitability for establishment of forestry in the region. Thus, there is little expectation of 
substantial credits earned in Nebraska. The biggest impact in Nebraska from the afforestation 
will be the impact on commodity prices due to acreage shifts in other parts of the country. The 
decline in U.S. crop acreage and the corresponding increase in crop prices could offer 
substantial benefits to Nebraska agriculture, especially if the acreage shifts in Nebraska are 
small as was assumed earlier. However, the gains will be partially offset by the increased feed 
prices to Nebraska’s livestock sector and the expected reduction in livestock production as a 
result. 
 
 Net Impact on Nebraska Agriculture  
 As with the national analysis, the net impact of potential climate legislation or 
regulation on Nebraska agriculture is very dependent on the exact provisions of proposed rules 
as well as the assumptions and modeling parameters used in the studies. In general, Nebraska 
agriculture would see modestly higher production costs in the short run and somewhat greater 
cost increases in the long run relative to baseline levels, but those cost increases are a larger 
share of net farm income in the state and therefore represent a significant economic shock to 
the sector. Limited acreage shifts in Nebraska likely mean these costs are largely realized, but 
they will be offset to some extent by cuts in fertilizer usage and acreage nationally that drive up 
commodity prices. Nebraska agriculture could benefit from climate legislation or regulation if 
new rules lead to increased demand for biofuel production, of which Nebraska is a leading 
producer. Nebraska agriculture could also benefit by sequestering carbon and earning carbon 
credits if agriculture is allowed to do so and if “good actors” are rewarded for carbon already 
sequestered through existing practices. The carbon credits earned by Nebraska agriculture 
could exceed the increased input costs under analyzed scenarios. While costs are projected to 
increase $128 million over baseline estimates in the short run, carbon credits from conservation 
tillage could be worth as much as $199 million in the short run. In the long run, costs are 
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projected to increase $334 million over baseline estimates while carbon credits from 
conservation tillage could be worth as much as $698 million. In addition, land use changes 
nationally away from cropland and grassland to forestry could benefit Nebraska agriculture by 
driving up commodity prices, although the Nebraska livestock sector would also have to absorb 
higher feed costs in the process. 
 In summary, Nebraska agriculture could benefit from climate legislation or regulation 
based on the analysis above, but, as with the national results, the gains are largely dependent 
on carbon offset revenues and increased prices from reduced agricultural production. The 
analysis does not consider potential costs to Nebraska agriculture if agriculture is regulated 
instead of exempted and the analysis does not consider the cost to consumers of reduced 
production and higher commodity prices. 
 
D.  Economic Consequences for Nebraska 
Several of the national studies of cap and trade legislation broke out estimated 
economic consequences to the State level. For example, the American Council for Capital 
Formation-National Association of Manufacturers (ACCF-NEM) study produced an estimate of 
the impact of the Waxman-Markey legislation for each of the 50 states. These estimates were 
broken out from the national estimates in the ACCF-NEM report, which were discussed in 
Chapter 3. Table 4.6 below summarizes the estimated impact of that legislation for major 
economic indicators for Nebraska. Once again, results are presented for the Low Cost and High 
Cost scenarios developed by ACCF-NEM. Recall that both of these cases corresponded roughly 
to the No International/Limited scenario in the Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
analysis. This was the highest cost scenario developed by EIA.  
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Table 4.6 
Economic Consequences for Nebraska of Cap and Trade Programs by Scenario in ACCF/NAM 
Report 
Variable Low Cost High Cost 
 
 
Low Cost High Cost 
    
 
  
  
2020 
 
 
 
2030 
Waxman-Markey 
   
 
  Employment 90 -610 
 
 -14,420 -19,630 
Gross State Product (Millions 2007$) -$71 -$122 
 
  -$750  -$1,023 
Residential Electricity Prices ($/KWH) $0.007 $0.001 
 
 $0.023  $0.028 
Note: Results presented in $/MMBTU and converted to $/KWH by authors 
Source: ACCF/NAM (2009). 
 
 Results show that there are also substantial impacts at the state level. This can be seen 
most clearly in the estimated impact on employment. Results show modest employment losses 
for the year 2020, but then economic consequences grow between 2020 and 2030, just as in 
the national analysis as emissions allowances become more costly. Nebraska is expected to 
have between 14,400 and 19,600 fewer jobs in 2030 with the Waxman-Markey legislation, 
depending on the scenario. In other words, employment will continue to grow in Nebraska 
between 2010 and 2030, but it will grow by 14,400 to 19,600 fewer jobs. This is the equivalent 
of 1 to 2 years of “lost” employment growth.  
 Results in Table 4.6 indicate meaningful economic consequences for the State of 
Nebraska, just as was found at the national level, but the key issue is: will losses be more or less 
severe in Nebraska than nationwide? This issue is examined in Table 4.7, where the losses in 
Table 4.6 are put in terms of the percentage of the Nebraska economy. Once in percentage 
terms, state losses can be compared with the percentage losses at the national level examined 
in Chapter 3.   
 Results suggest that the percent increase in retail electricity prices increases would be 
similar in Nebraska and the United States under ACCF-NEM’s lower cost scenario. However, 
Nebraska price increases would be less severe than national price increases in the High Cost 
scenario. The 2.3 cents/kwh to 2.8 cents/kwh price increases predicted for 2030 residential 
electricity prices in Nebraska in the ACCF-NEM analysis of the Waxman-Markey legislation 
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represent a 27.6% to 33.6% price increase over the base case/reference scenario.6  Further, 
even these substantial increases may be on the low end of possible price changes. Analysis by 
the Omaha Public Power District estimates that retail rates (including residential, commercial, 
and industrial customers) would rise by 97% by 2030 under Waxman-Markey legislation and by 
89% under the Kerry-Lieberman legislation.  
 Looking at other measures, ACCF-NEM estimates of job loss in Nebraska are very similar 
to national losses. In 2030, Nebraska employment would be 1.2% to 1.7% lower compared to 
the reference case under the Waxman-Markey legislation, similar to the percentage decline 
nationwide. ACCF-NEM estimates for GDP loss, however, would be less severe in Nebraska than 
nationwide. This result is at odds with the findings for employment and residential electricity 
rates. This may occur in part because business activity losses under Waxman-Markey (outside 
of energy sectors) are most severe in the manufacturing sector, and the Nebraska 
manufacturing sector has a lower share of business activity in the portions of the 
manufacturing sector that are hardest hit by the Waxman-Markey legislation. This result also 
may occur given that Nebraska has a large agricultural sector that could be lightly impacted by 
climate change legislation or regulation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
                                                             
6
 For baseline scenarios, we assumed that employment, gross state product, and electricity prices grew at the 
same rate in Nebraska between 2007 and 2030 as each grew nationally under the reference scenario in the ACCF-
NEM report. 
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Table 4.7 
Percent Economic Consequences for Nebraska and United States of Cap and Trade Programs 
by Scenario in ACCF/NAM Report 
    
 
  
Variable Low Cost High Cost 
 
 
Low Cost High Cost 
    
 
  
  
2020 
 
 
 
2030 
Nebraska  
   
 
  Employment     0.0%     -0.1% 
 
     -1.2%          -1.7% 
Gross Domestic Product (Millions 2007$)    -0.1%     -0.1% 
 
     -0.5%          -0.7% 
Residential Electricity Price ($/KWH)     8.8%      1.3% 
 
    27.6%         33.6% 
    
 
  United States 
   
 
  Employment 0.0% 0.0% 
 
 -1.1% -1.5% 
Gross Domestic Product (Millions 2007$) -0.2% -0.4% 
 
 -1.8% -2.4% 
Residential Electricity Price ($/KWH) 4.9% 7.9% 
 
 31.4% 50.0% 
Source: ACCF/NAM (2009). 
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Chapter 5: Summary 
This document summarized key economic issues surrounding climate change legislation 
and regulation and considered the potential implications for Nebraska. We began with a 
discussion of economic theory and principles that pertain to climate change policy, and then 
proceeded to evaluate the economic consequences of climate change legislation and regulation 
for the nation in general, and Nebraska in specific. 
We demonstrated that economic theory suggests that a tax can be used to ensure that 
polluters consider the negative externalities of pollution on society. Such a tax, or alternative 
approach such as a cap and trade system, however, must be set at the appropriate level to 
reflect externality costs. The difficulty in the case of any type of pollution is that there is often 
uncertainty about the true social costs of emissions. This issue is particularly difficult in the case 
of greenhouse gas emissions, given that there is uncertainty as to the precise manmade 
contribution to global warming and to how much this increase in global warming will impact the 
economy. Economic consequences also may occur decades in the future, and thus will be 
heavily discounted. Despite this uncertainty, the public may choose to regulate and reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions, either in order to reduce the chances of a severe economic 
outcome, or out of a concern for the environment that is unrelated to economic issues.  
When making such a decision, however, it is critical to understand the cost to the 
economy of the proposed regulation. As a result, we considered the potential economic 
consequences of recent proposed legislation to limit greenhouse gas emissions. For our 
analysis, we used the example of recent climate change legislation in the United States House 
of Representatives (Waxman-Markey) and in the United States Senate (Kerry-Lieberman). Our 
review of literature and analysis found that either of these versions of cap and trade legislation 
would likely lead to a 2% reduction in U.S. GDP by the year 2030 relative to a reference scenario 
without climate change legislation. Losses in U.S. GDP may be less severe in the decades leading 
up to 2030, but also may be just as severe after 2030. Retail electric prices also are expected to 
rise by 30% to 70% by 2030 under the climate change regulation, depending on the scenario. 
The manufacturing sector will be especially hard-hit, with a 5% to 7% decline in industrial 
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output and manufacturing employment, given that the energy-intensive, internationally 
competitive manufacturing sector is expected to be hard-hit by increases in energy prices. 
The economic consequences might be expected to be more modest in Nebraska, 
however. The state has a smaller share of manufacturing activity in the hardest-hit segments of 
the industry. And, the state has a large agricultural sector which may be impacted lightly or 
even benefit from climate change legislation or regulation. Based on analysis of production 
agriculture and gross state product, agriculture has produced an average of about $5 billion in 
net value added in the past five years out of an average gross state product of about $77 billion 
for a 6.5% share. This compares to a 1.1% share nationwide.   
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